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Using U.S. and euro area data, this paper presents a signiﬁcant and propor-
tional relationship between money growth and subsequent inﬂa t i o nw h e na c -
counting for equilibrium velocity movements due to inﬂation regimes changes.
These movements, driven by money demand adjustments to low-frequency Fish-
erian interest rate variations, are derived from consistent U.S. and euro area
money demand speciﬁcations — after contradictory coexisting results are ex-
plained. Not accounting for equilibrium velocity and interest rate movements
biases cross-country and time series dynamic money growth / inﬂation esti-
mated relationships, and leads to the non-proportional, non-signiﬁcant, and
reverse causality results found in studies that include the post-1980 period.
(JEL E52, E58, E41, E31)
∗Swiss National Bank, Research, P.O. Box, 8022 Zurich, Switzerland. Phone: +41 44 631 3216.
Email: samuel.reynard@snb.ch. The views expressed in this paper do not necessarily reﬂect those
of the Swiss National Bank. I am particularly grateful to Peter Kugler and Ed Nelson for help-
ful discussions and comments on several drafts, as well as Katrin Assenmacher-Wesche, Luca Be-
nati, Jean-Pierre Danthine, Andreas Fischer, Petra Gerlach-Kristen, Stefan Gerlach, Robert Lu-
cas, Athanasios Orphanides, Michel Peytrignet, Marcel Savioz, Cédric Tille, and seminar partic-
ipants at the Buba/CFS/ECB seminar series, the Bank of England, the University of Lausanne,
the SNB/BoC/Cleveland Fed conference, and the SNB/NBP seminar, for helpful comments. I also
beneﬁted from discussions with ECB staﬀ members, and in particular with Klaus Adam, Björn Fis-
c h e r ,D i e t e rG e r d e s m e i e r ,O t m a rI s s i n g ,K l a u sM a s u c h ,H u wP i l l ,B a r b a r aR o ﬃa, Rolf Strauch, and
Thomas Westermann. U.S. and euro area data were kindly provided by Ruth Judson and Robert
Rasche, and by Sergio Nicoletti Altimari, Alistair Dieppe, Paola Donati, Björn Fischer, Adriana
Lojschova and Rolf Strauch, respectively. Luca Benati kindly provided his codes for the spectral
analysis.
1In the 1980s and 1990s, the consensus about the existence of a useful link between
money and inﬂation and/or a stable money demand relationship broke down. For ex-
ample, Friedman and Kuttner (1992) wrote: “[i]ncluding data from the 1980’s sharply
weakens the postwar time-series evidence indicating signiﬁcant relationships between
money (however deﬁned) and nominal income or between money and either real in-
come or prices separately. Focusing on data from 1970 onward destroys this evidence
altogether”, and further: “...before the 1980’s, there was widespread agreement that
ﬂuctuations in money did contain at least potentially useful information about future
income and price movements. In the 1980’s, however, the empirical basis underlying
that agreement disappeared.” Other examples include DeLong (2000), who stated
that “...the velocity of money turned unstable in the 1980s, but not in any manner
simply correlated with the rate of money growth”, and Mankiw (1997), who wrote:
“[t]he deep recession that the United States experienced in 1982 is partly attributable
to a large, unexpected, and still mostly unexplained decline in velocity”.
Even though studies using data from the euro area have been relatively more sup-
portive of monetary aggregates1, the reported relationships between money and in-
ﬂation as well as the estimated money demand speciﬁcations vary substantially from
one study to another. Moreover, De Grauwe and Polan (2001) argue that “[t]he rela-
tionship between inﬂa t i o na n dm o n e yg r o w t hf o rl o wi n ﬂation countries (on average
less than 10% per annum over the last 30 years) is weak", i.e. below proportionality
and non-signiﬁcant; the latter study has been used, for example, to criticize the ECB
1See, for example, Assenmacher-Wesche and Gerlach (2005), Benati (2005a, b), Brand,
Gerdesmeier and Roﬃa (2002) and references therein, Bruggeman, Donati and Warne (2003),
Bruggeman et al. (2005), Gerlach (2003, 2004), Gerlach and Svensson (2003), Kugler and Kaufmann
(2005), Neumann (2003), Neumann and Greiber (2004) and references therein, Nicoletti Altimari
(2001), and von Hagen (2004).
2monetary policy strategy2.
I will develop here my arguments using U.S. and euro area data, respectively from
the 1950s and 1970s, and compare the ﬁndings to the existing literature. The analysis
presented in this paper establishes that there exists a signiﬁcant and proportional
relationship between money growth and subsequent inﬂation even during low inﬂation
episodes, like e.g. in the U.S. and the euro area in the 1980s and 1990s. The analysis
generalizes to other countries and allows for cross-country comparisons.
The paper argues that the reported weak relationship between money growth
and inﬂation in low inﬂation economies, in the forms of a non-signiﬁcant or non-
proportional inﬂuence of money growth on inﬂation, in cross-country or time series
studies, is due to not accounting for movements in equilibrium velocity due to Fish-
erian movements in interest rates. This is why issues appear when including data
from the 1980s and 1990s, a period characterized by disinﬂa t i o ni nm o s ti n d u s t r i -
alized countries. As Nelson (2003) reports, Friedman (1985) notes that “[a] break
in the trend of velocity [...] has been observed whenever and wherever accelerating
inﬂation has been succeeded by disinﬂation”. Nelson, in his review of empirical ev-
idence on money and inﬂation, argues that falls in interest rates due to the Fisher
eﬀect can justify the negative correlation between money growth and velocity growth
that puzzle De Grauwe and Polan and weaken cross-country money growth / inﬂa-
tion relationships. Those changes in equilibrium velocity are central to the analysis
presented below.
The paper establishes that, when movements in equilibrium velocity due to money
demand adjustments to diﬀerent inﬂation regimes are accounted for, there is a signif-
icant and proportional relationship between money growth and subsequent inﬂation,
2See Begg et al. (2002) and Svensson (2002), referenced in Nelson (2003).
3even with data starting only in the 1970s or 1980s. The relationship between money
growth and inﬂa t i o ni se x a m i n e dt h r o u g hd i ﬀerent angles, i.e. with long run aver-
ages, spectral analysis and a vector autoregression framework, and results are robust
to diﬀerent speciﬁcations and periods considered. I ﬁnd proportionality between the
two variables, a substantial and signiﬁcant fraction of inﬂation forecast error vari-
ance explained by money growth “shocks”, and that money growth Granger-causes
inﬂation.
In contrast, not accounting for equilibrium changes in velocity and interest rates
leads to the non-proportional and non-signiﬁcant inﬂuence of money growth on inﬂa-
tion, and even reverse causality, that the literature including the post-1980 period has
reported for time series as well as cross-country studies of low inﬂation economies.
The basic idea is that, for example, when inﬂation persistently decreases, as it
did in the past 25 years in most industrialized countries, money grows faster than
prices as interest rates and the opportunity cost of money persistently decrease, which
induces people to hold additional money balances. Comparing money growth with
inﬂation without accounting for that change in equilibrium velocity thus leads to a
weakened link between money growth and future inﬂation. Increasing money balances
resulting from declining interest rates due to the Fisher eﬀect is a transitory level
eﬀect that can last several years and which is not associated with higher subsequent
inﬂation; this thus biases empirical results on the relationship between money growth
and inﬂation. In other words, as interest rates decline as the result of disinﬂation,
inﬂation decreases by more than what money could explain if we do not account
for interest rates equilibrium movements. This is what has led many observers to
conclude that the link between money and inﬂa t i o ni sw e a ki nl o wi n ﬂation countries,
4as many industrialized countries experienced disinﬂation in the past two decades. The
same argument (but in the opposite direction) applies in inﬂationary episodes, like
e.g. in the 1970s in the U.S. Moreover, when samples with accelerating inﬂation as
well as disinﬂation are considered, the dynamic relationship between money growth
and inﬂation is also aﬀected and the result of a less than proportional eﬀect of money
growth on inﬂation emerges, as Fisherian interest rate movements generate a negative
correlation between low-frequency money growth and velocity growth. Thus, not
accounting for changes in equilibrium velocity and interest rates results in biased
coeﬃcients in estimations of the inﬂuence of money growth and other variables on
inﬂation. Moreover, the corresponding results are dependent of the sample considered,
as the underlying trend and ﬂuctuations in velocity growth diﬀer across samples.
To account for changes in equilibrium velocity, I adjust monetary aggregates by
money demand responses to low-frequency opportunity cost movements, driven by
changes in inﬂationary environments, using long run money demand elasticity esti-
mates3. Money growth rates are thus purged from these transitional but protracted
cost-driven level eﬀects on money balances. The argument does not rely on short-
term money demand econometric stability but uses long-term elasticity estimates to
account for equilibrium Fisherian changes in interest rates. Given that the literature
has provided with various apparently inconsistent results on money demand rela-
tionships, i.e. cases of instability or diﬀerent estimates, particularly with respect to
income elasticity, section I reviews some results and explains why these apparently
contradicting ﬁndings have coexisted in the literature since the 1980s disinﬂation pe-
3Both sets of variables, market interest rates and opportunity costs, the latter being computed
as market rates minus own deposit rates of monetary aggregates, are dominated by Fisherian low-
frequency movements in the datasets considered. I use the true opportunity cost where available.
Further discussions on opportunity costs are provided below.
5riod. I present consistent results for both U.S. and euro area long run money demand
estimates, which are then used in section II to account for changes in equilibrium
velocity.
The analysis shows that when monetary assets are chosen so as to correspond to
the transaction concept of Baumol-Tobin, i.e. assets yielding transaction or mone-
tary services, and when the eﬀects of disinﬂation on money demand are appropriately
accounted for, money demand estimation results in a unitary aggregate income elas-
ticity and a similar interest rate elasticity with both U.S. and euro area data. A
unitary income elasticity corresponds to the prediction of the Baumol theory if we
assume that “it is the number of cash ﬂows to be managed that doubles whenever
real GDP doubles, not their average size” (Lucas, 2000).
Diﬀerent U.S. estimates emerge depending on whether substitutes to checking ac-
counts, also yielding transaction services, are accounted for, and how the particularly
eventful period of the 1970s is treated. As those substitutes were introduced in the
early 1980s with ﬁnancial deregulation, at a time characterized by disinﬂation and a
corresponding drop in interest rates, not accounting for these additional accounts cre-
ates the appearance of a weak money demand relative to the drop in opportunity cost.
This, together with preceding ﬁnancial market events in the 1970s which induced a
major structural change in aggregate money demand, made it diﬃcult to interpret
the changing behavior of M1 when interest rates and inﬂation were declining, and
explain why recent income elasticity estimates of narrow monetary aggregates have
been relatively low. U.S. studies were thus mostly aﬀected by issues of deﬁnitions
and events interpretations.
Euro area money demand studies have also resulted in various estimated money
6demand speciﬁcations. I argue that the key factor to account for, which has been
neglected in some studies, is that the opportunity cost of holding money balances
has gone down dramatically during the past twenty-ﬁve years. Not accounting for
this fact leads to money demand misspeciﬁcations, as the level of money balances has
shifted up as a result of this development. Given that income has been increasing as
well, not accounting for the drop in opportunity cost as a cause of the real money
level increase leads to an overestimation of income elasticity.
Moreover, given that the commonly used euro area data samples begin in the
early 1980s and are thus dominated by the disinﬂation period, both combinations of
higher income elasticity / lower interest rate elasticity and lower income elasticity
/ higher interest rate elasticity can coexist econometrically, depending on the exact
sample period or estimation method, as income and money were trending upward
while interest rates were trending downward, with all relatively smooth trends. The
argument is similar to that of Lucas (1988), but in the opposite direction, i.e. in
a disinﬂationary rather than an inﬂationary environment. Lucas showed that, as
all three series of money, interest rate and income were increasing during the 1970s
inﬂationary episode in the U.S., money demand estimations over the 1958-85 period
can result in unitary income elasticity, conﬁrming the pre-war speciﬁcation of Meltzer
(1963), or in both lower income and interest elasticities. When the sample is extended
and include “stationary periods”, a unitary income elasticity emerges.
Given that some episodes have to be assessed using cross-sectional evidence and
other periods lead to an observational equivalence or imprecise results in terms of
money demand estimates, I impose the elasticity estimates uncovered by the analysis
of section I, similar for both U.S. and euro area data, to account for equilibrium
7velocity movements in section II. This guarantees that these latter movements are
appropriately accounted for and improves the estimates eﬃciency. Readers interested
only in the paper ﬁndings regarding the estimated inﬂuence of money growth on
inﬂation can skip section I and go directly to section II. Section III concludes.
I. Disinﬂation and money demand estimates
A. Nonlinearity, deregulation and ﬁnancial innovations - U.S. data
The ﬁrst blow to the consensus that considered money a useful indicator for mon-
etary policy came in the early 1980s. At that time, the velocity of M1,t h em o n e t a r y
aggregate oﬃcially considered by the Federal Reserve Board, started to exhibit ﬂuc-
tuations, as can be seen from Figure 1, after having grown smoothly for the prior
three decades4.
Given the change in behavior of M1 velocity, it was argued that the demand for M1
had become unstable. DeLong (2000), by referring to a ﬁgure plotting the velocity
of M1 against a pre-1980 trend line over the period 1960-2000, writes: “[t]he sharp
swings in the velocity of money in the 1980s, as shown in Figure 1, led not to a
renewed commitment to stable inﬂation and money growth to eliminate such swings,
but instead to a distrust by central bankers of monetary aggregates as indicators.”
What was considered as a change in behavior of the velocity of M1 in the 1980s
coincided with ﬁnancial deregulation, with the introduction of new accounts providing
4M1 consists of cash, demand and checking deposits. The opportunity cost is the 3-month
Treasury bill rate minus the weighted average of interest rates paid on the diﬀerent monetary assets.
U.S. data were downloaded from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis FRED (internet) database,
and are released by the Federal Reserve Board, the Bureau of Economic Analysis and the Bureau
of Labor Statistics. Monetary series prior to 1959 are from Rasche (1987, 1990). Interest rates paid
on the various monetary assets were provided to me by Ruth Judson and Robert Rasche. All series
except interest rates are seasonally adjusted.
8transactions services, and with the disinﬂation. Instead of recognizing the transaction
properties of those newly introduced accounts, the change in the behavior of M1 was
attributed to the fact that the distinction between what was traditionally considered
as transactions and savings balances became diﬃcult to draw, as checking accounts
began to earn interest. Referring to graphs which compare the evolution of the
velocity of M1 with its pre-1980 trend, economists sharing this view seem to have
expected transaction balances not to react to their opportunity cost, and their velocity
to keep increasing smoothly5. It is often suggested that an explanation for the upward
trend in M1 velocity during the post-war period is that technical progress in credit
cards and other advances would have allowed individuals to economize on money
balances, justifying an income elasticity below unity.
Thus, the conventional view is to consider the swings in the velocity of M1 in
the 1980s, and the fact that the velocity stopped its smooth ascension, as a puzzle,
and as an argument that monetary aggregates should not be considered anymore as
indicators for monetary policy. However, if we have in mind a model where people
trade oﬀ real resources with monetary assets, in order to carry out transactions, the
puzzle is rather the smooth behavior of the velocity of M1 during the 1970s, i.e. in
particular the fact that velocity did not drop with the falls in nominal interest rates
in 1970 and 1974, and the fact that velocity increased faster than interest rates over
the 1950s, 60s and 70s. Moreover, instead of being surprised by the decline in velocity
at the beginning of the 1980s, we would wonder why the velocity did not decrease
more sharply at that time, with the initial fall in nominal interest rates.
5For example, Mankiw (1997) wrote: “[f]or reasons that are still not fully understood, the velocity
of money (nominal GDP divided by M1) fell in the early 1980s substantially below its previous
upward trend. This fall contributed to a reduction in aggregate demand, which in turn led to the
1982 recession, one of the deepest in recent history”, and further: “[t]he experience of the early
1980s shows that the Fed cannot rely on the velocity of money remaining stable”.
9Indeed, if we compare the evolution of M1 with its opportunity cost, as shown in
Figure 1, we notice that M1 velocity did not decline by the amount justiﬁed by the
strong decrease in opportunity cost in 1982 due to Volcker’s disinﬂation. This appar-
e n tp u z z l ea c t u a l l yr e ﬂects the fact that, with ﬁnancial deregulation and innovations,
new types of accounts providing monetary services, thus substitutes to M1,w e r ei n -
troduced. Those accounts generally yield rates close to checking accounts, below the
3-month T-bill rate, and are checkable. When those new accounts are included, as
i st h ec a s ei nF i g u r e2 ,i na na g g r e g a t ec a l l e dMUS hereafter for comparisons with
euro area data, then a clear drop in velocity occurs with the disinﬂation, i.e. a strong
increase in money demand as interest rates dropped6.
The swings in M1 velocity represented thus well the eﬀect of disinﬂation and ﬂuc-
tuations in its opportunity cost. The apparent instability of M1 velocity since the
late 1990s reﬂects a particular ﬁnancial innovation, sweep programs7, which induced
substitutions internalized in MUS. The reason why the sensitivity of M1 and MUS to
interest rate ﬂuctuations has increased since the late 1970s and velocity shifted up-
wards in the 1970s can be explained by an increase in ﬁnancial market participation
that took place mostly in the 1970s, as documented in Reynard (2004). Note that
MUS seems to have grown faster than what would have been expected from the evo-
6MUS corresponds to M2 minus small time deposits, or M2 Minus in the FRED database.
It includes M1 plus savings accounts, money market deposit accounts, and retail money market
funds. These assets correspond to what the Surveys of Consumer Finances group as “Transaction
Accounts” (see Kennickell et al., 2000). For a study of monetary assets in the context of Divisia or
Currency-Equivalent indexes, see Rotemberg et al. (1995). Analysis of this and broader aggregates
can be found in Carlson, Hoﬀman, Keen and Rasche (2000), Carlson and Keen (1996), Motley
(1988), Poole (1991), and Reynard (2004). Compared to the aggregate MZM, MUS does not
include institutional money market funds as the latter assets are related to portfolio rather than
transaction considerations and exhibit instability from the mid-1990s on (see discussion on broad
aggregates below).
7Sweep programs allow banks to temporarily transfer funds between money market accounts and
other checkable accounts, in an optimal timing, so as to reduce the amount of required reserves. See
Anderson (1997a, b).
10lution of its opportunity cost towards the end of the sample; however, this apparent
instability does not appear when the logarithms of those variables are considered, i.e.
in a log-log money demand speciﬁcation, as can be seen from Figure 3.
Money demand estimations of MUS appear in Table 18. We thus obtain a unitary
income elasticity, and an increase in interest rate elasticity from -.065 before the
velocity shift, to -.128 after the shift. In order to account for the increase in ﬁnancial
market participation, in section II MUS will be adjusted for the 1970s velocity shift9.
The behavior of money in the 1980s, when correctly measured, was thus aﬀected
by the disinﬂation in the way we expect money to react to a change in its opportunity
cost, i.e. with a strong increase in money balances reﬂecting the sharp fall in interest
rates. But given the particular events that took place during the 1970s, i.e. the
increase in ﬁnancial market participation, the change in behavior of M1 was not
correctly interpreted. People considered the smooth increase in the 1970s as normal
and a large literature developed around modeling dynamic short-term money demand
adjustments, where in fact those ﬂuctuations were due to instability episodes.
When changes in ﬁnancial market participation and substitutes of monetary assets
included in M1 are not taken into account, the eﬀects of the disinﬂation period
are not correctly assessed and this explains why diﬀerent income elasticity estimates
have emerged from econometric studies. Studies based on narrower aggregates not
including checking accounts substitutes, like e.g. Ball (2001), ﬁnd income elasticity
8DOLS regressions use one lead and lag of the ﬁrst diﬀerences and an AR(2) process for the error.
Samples choice according to Reynard (2004).
9To account for the increase in ﬁnancial market participation, an estimated trend will be added
to MUS from 1970 to 1976. Moreover, when money will be adjusted by its interest rate elasticity to
account for equilibrium velocity movements, both the pre- and post- velocity shift interest elasticity
estimates will be used, together with an estimated trend on the elasticity between 1970 and 1976.
Results in section II are not signiﬁcantly aﬀected if instead the trend covers the 1965-1976 period
and/or if a single interest rate elasticity is used over the whole sample.
11estimates below unity, whereas studies based on broader aggregates, e.g. Carlson,
Hoﬀman, Keen and Rasche (2000) and Reynard (2004), ﬁnd a higher and usually
unitary income elasticity. This is due to the fact that when substitutes from checkable
deposits and the increase in ﬁnancial market participation are not taken into account,
money does not appear to have increased as much as the decline in opportunity cost
would have implied during the early 1980s disinﬂation, and the velocity of M1 appears
to have increased faster than interest rates in the 1960s and 70s. As a result, the pre-
1980 increase in velocity is not attributed to the increase in interest rate but to
economies of scale, thus the estimated income elasticity is below unity.
Additional assets, like certiﬁcates of deposits or institutional money market mutual
funds, have been used in broader U.S. monetary aggregates studies, and similar assets
with maturity over 3 months and up to many years are included in broader monetary
aggregates in general. However, I do not consider them as monetary assets, as their
link to the transaction concept is less clear, and both of them are closely related to
portfolio considerations. Although it is diﬃcult to know exactly where to draw the
line, there are several issues in considering such assets. First, if we consider assets
like time deposits with longer maturities, it would be natural then to include other
assets, like e.g. bonds, with similar maturities. Not including those additional assets
is likely to generate money demand instability due to portfolio considerations linked
with ﬁnancial market events, similar to what happened in the early 1990s in the U.S.10;
at that time, the switch from certiﬁcates of deposits to bonds and stocks mutual funds
caused instability in M2. Also, institutional money market funds grew abnormally
fast from the mid-1990s on. Second, given their looser link with transactions, broader
10Several explanations for that event have been provided. See e.g. Carlson, Hoﬀman, Keen and
Rasche (2000), and Collins and Edwards (1994).
12monetary aggregates are less likely to exhibit a stable relationship with GDP, i.e. a
stable income elasticity. Diﬀerent studies with broader aggregates, for example in the
euro area, result in diﬀerent values for income elasticity, usually signiﬁcantly above
unity, with no theory to restrict it, and those estimates are usually very sensitive to the
sample period. And third, as assets included in those aggregates yield rates equal to or
above the 3-month market rate, those aggregates are sometimes positively correlated
with the 3-month rate, thus making their policy stance interpretation diﬃcult.
The analysis in section II, assessing the eﬀects of money growth on inﬂation, will
thus use money demand estimates from MUS, which includes assets usually yielding
an interest rate close to the one paid on checkable accounts and below the 3-month
risk-free rate, thus providing transaction or monetary services: households and ﬁrms
accept a lower yield, reﬂecting banks’ resources to provide transaction services, in
order to have assets available to buy goods and services. Moreover, the apparent in-
stability and stability phases of MUS can be explained in terms of extensive/intensive
margins of money demand, as shown in Reynard (2004): an upward velocity shift
occurred in the 1970s as a larger fraction of U.S. households started to hold non-
monetary assets as part of their ﬁnancial portfolio, and money demand remained
stable in the 1980s and 1990s as ﬁnancial market participation remained constant as
a fraction of U.S. households.
B. Disinﬂation, term structure and short samples - euro area data
Money demand studies using euro area data have also resulted in various outcomes
regarding money demand speciﬁcations, particularly with respect to the income elas-
ticity. Some euro area studies have found a unitary income elasticity, e.g. von Hagen
13(2004), whereas other studies ﬁnd an income elasticity signiﬁcantly greater than unity,
e.g. Neumann and Greiber (2004) and references therein, Brand, Gerdesmeier and
Roﬃa (2002) and references therein, Bruggeman, Donati and Warne (2003), and Ger-
lach and Svensson (2003), who ﬁnd a unitary income elasticity but with a positive
trend in money balances, which, as argued below, amounts to ﬁnding a higher income
elasticity over the period considered. I will illustrate my arguments with both M2,
the counterpart of MUS in the euro area, hereafter referred to as M2EA,a n dM3,
hereafter M3EA, the aggregate usually used in euro area studies. While my analysis
applies to both M2EA and M3EA, my preference for M2EA over M3EA is based on the
discussion above11.
The choice of opportunity cost - Studies which ﬁnd an income elasticity signiﬁcantly
higher than unity usually use the spread between long- and short-term interest rates
(i.e. 10-year and 3-month, respectively) as the opportunity cost of money balances.
An important feature of that spread is that it does not exhibit a downward trend
over the past 25 years, as shown in Figure 4. A major conceptual issue in using that
spread as the opportunity cost is that the 3-month rate, supposed to reﬂect the own
r a t e ,i si nf a c tt h ea l t e r n a t i v er a t eo fl a r g ep a r t so fM2EA and M3EA. In contrast,
own rates of monetary assets are lower than 3-month market rates, as those assets
provide transaction services, and are relatively sticky.
11M2EA includes currency, overnight deposits, deposits with an agreed maturity up to 2 years, and
deposits redeemable at a period of notice up to 3 months. Thus M2EA includes some time deposits
with maturity over 3 months, but does not include debt securities, included in M3EA.N o t ea l s ot h a t
M2EA does not include money market funds, contrary to MUS. However, including or not these
latter assets is not crutial empirically; issues arise mainly when assets with yields close to checking
or transaction accounts are not included, and/or if signiﬁcant amounts of assets with yields above
a (policy-controlled) 3-month interest rate are included, for the reasons mentioned in the discussion
above. Euro area data are from the euro Area Wide Model (AWM; see Fagan, Henry, and Mestre,
2005), Bruggeman, Donati, and Warne (2003), and the ECB internet site, and were provided to me
by Alistair Dieppe, Paola Donati, Björn Fischer, Adriana Lojschova and Rolf Strauch. All series
except interest rates are seasonally adjusted.
14However, Figure 5, which displays the (log) velocity12 of M2EA together with the
(log) 3-month interest rate, suggests that the velocity of money has been aﬀected by
the disinﬂation over the 1980s and 1990s. It is clear from Figure 5 that the strong
(about 25 percent) decrease in velocity of the 1980s and 1990s was associated with the
major disinﬂa t i o nt h a to c c u r r e dd u r i n gt h a ts a m ep e r i o di nt h ee u r oa r e a .As i m i l a r
picture is obtained when velocity is plotted against the long-term interest rate, and
available opportunity cost measures for M3EA also show a downward trend similar
to market rates, as retail rates are relatively sticky and did not decrease to the same
extent as ﬁnancial market rates did13.
Thus the 1980s and 1990s were characterized by falling inﬂation and interest rates,
through the Fisher eﬀect, and real money balances reacted to that evolution by in-
creasing strongly. Studies that consider the long/short interest rate spread as the
opportunity cost are thus likely to overlook the eﬀect of disinﬂation and ﬁnd a higher
income elasticity, as the increase in money balances is attributed to increasing income,
given that the spread is not trending downwards. If, however, a trend is included in
those money demand speciﬁcations, as in Gerlach and Svensson (2003) for example,
the eﬀect of disinﬂation, i.e. the fact that money increased by more than prices on
average over the sample, appears in the trend instead of the income elasticity.
The cointegrating money demand relation, estimated by dynamic least squares
12T h eH I C Pi su s e df o rt h ep r i c el e v e l .U s i n gt h eG D Pd e ﬂator instead does not aﬀect the analysis,
but the ﬁtw i t hM2EA deteriorates, particularly in the 1970s, whereas the ﬁtw i t hM3EA improves
in that earlier period; over the 1975-2003 period, M3EA income and interest elasticities are 1.01 and
−.13, respectively.
13Opportunity cost measures are particularly diﬃcult to compute for the euro area, and an oppor-
tunity cost for M2EA can currently not be computed for the whole sample. However, the opportunity
cost of M3EA computed by Bruggeman, Donati and Warne (2003) over the 1980-2001 sample trends
downwards, similarly to the short- and long-term rates. The reason why those authors ﬁnd an
income elasticity higher than unity and an imprecise estimate of the interest rate elasticity might
come from the particular sample used, as explained below.







= −10.87 + 1.04 · ln(yt) − 0.13 · ln(ilt), (1)
(0.71) (0.05) (0.03)
where P is HICP (Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices), y is real GDP, and il is the
10-year government bond rate15. An interesting ﬁnding is that the money demand
function, using a comparable monetary aggregate, is very similar to the U.S. money
demand: as in the U.S. case, income elasticity is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from unity,
and the point estimate of interest rate elasticity is the same as the one obtained with
U.S. data for the post-velocity shift period starting in 1977.
Disinﬂation sample - An additional fact, also linked to the disinﬂation, is respon-
sible for generating diﬀe r e n to u t c o m e sf o rt h ei n c o m ee l a s t i c i t y ,g i v e nt h a tm o s te u r o
area studies on money demand use data from 1980 only. During a disinﬂation, as
was the case in the 1980s and 1990s, interest rates decrease. Given that, at the same
time, output keeps increasing, diﬀerent combinations of interest and income elastici-
ties can emerge from money demand estimations, i.e. a lower income elasticity and
a higher interest elasticity or vice versa, depending on the exact sample period and
estimation method, i.e. how the dynamics are modeled. This is similar, although in
the opposite direction, to the argument of Lucas (1988), who provided an explanation
for the various estimates of income elasticity in the U.S. during the period including
14Quarterly data. Regressions use two leads and lags of the ﬁrst diﬀerences and an AR(2) process
for the error. Standard errors in parentheses.
15I report here results with the long-term rate to ease comparison with the existing euro area
literature. Similar results are obtained when the short (3-month) rate is used instead of the long
r a t e ,w i t ha ni n t e r e s tr a t ee l a s t i c i t yo f.08. When income elasticity is constrained to unity, interest
elasticity is .14 and .1 for long and short rates, respectively.
16the inﬂation of the 1970s.
Equation (2) shows M2EA demand results for the 1980-2003 period, i.e. the period







= −12.57 + 1.15 · ln(yt) − 0.09 · ln(ilt). (2)
(1.10) (0.07) (0.03)
The income elasticity is higher, signiﬁcantly higher than unity, and the interest rate
elasticity is lower than in equation (1), when the information preceding the disinﬂation
period is not taken into account. However, when income elasticity is restricted to
unity, we recover the same higher interest rate elasticity of 0.14 over both periods, i.e.
1975-2003 and 1980-2003. This thus explains why diﬀerent money demand estimates
coexist in euro area studies, as given data limitation the sample period is usually
limited to the disinﬂation period, when the opportunity cost of money was trending
downwards and income was trending upwards.







= −19.38 + 1.63 · ln(yt) − 0.00 · ln(ilt). (3)
(1.32) (0.09) (0.04)
Unlike von Hagen (2004), despite using the same sample, the estimated income elastic-
ity here is much higher than unity. This reﬂects the previous argument, i.e. diﬀerent
estimation results can emerge from a sample limited to the disinﬂation period. Indeed,
17when income elasticity is restricted to unity, a long-term interest rate semi-elasticity16
of 0.029 is obtained, close to what was estimated by von Hagen (0.034).
II. Reconsidering the eﬀe c t so fm o n e yg r o w t ho ni n ﬂation
This section presents diﬀerent types of evidence in favor of a strong and proportional
relationship between money growth and subsequent inﬂation. Section A explains the
bias in cross-country as well as time series dynamic estimates of the money growth /
inﬂation relationship when equilibrium velocity movements due to inﬂation regimes
changes are not accounted for. Section B proposes a way of accounting for these
equilibrium movements. Section C presents proportionality results for medium to
long run averages and low-frequency spectral analysis. Section D presents time series
dynamic evidence of the inﬂuence of money growth on subsequent inﬂation and nomi-
nal income growth, with forecast error variance decompositions and Granger-causality
tests based on a VAR framework. The dramatic qualitative and quantitative eﬀects
of the equilibrium velocity adjustment are presented for both long run and dynamic
analysis. Finally, section E relates the ﬁndings to existing studies.
A. Inﬂation regimes, equilibrium velocity and econometric bias
As mentioned in the introduction, many economists have questioned the usefulness
of money in predicting subsequent price or nominal income movements in the 1980s
and 1990s. Consider Figure 6, which displays the (log) level of MUS together with the
after-1985 trend (6 percent per year) in nominal output. After 1985, the opportunity
16Von Hagen uses the semi-log speciﬁcation, so I report here the semi-elasticity. Using the M3
opportunity cost (3-month minus own rates) from Bruggeman, Donati and Warne (2003), yields an
interest rate elasticity of .09 when income elasticity is restricted to unity.
18cost of U.S. money balances has been stationary (see Figure 2), real output has
grown at an average of 3 percent, and inﬂation has been relatively stable at around
3 percent as well, with a temporary increase around 1990 and a temporary drop
in the late 1990s. Figure 6 displays a clear relationship between nominal income
growth and money growth during that period, in sharp contrast with the claims cited
above. Moreover, the two inﬂation ﬂuctuations of the early and late 1990s followed,
with a lag, deviations of money from its trend17. The following analysis explains the
econometric misspeciﬁcation that lead economists, like e.g. Friedman and Kuttner
(FK), to claim that including the post-1980 period destroys evidence of a link between
money and nominal income, and provides an appropriate speciﬁcation that can be
implemented in empirical studies of inﬂation dynamics.
Money growth / inﬂation discrepancies and inﬂation regimes changes - The main
issue is that money growth increased signiﬁcantly with the disinﬂation of the early
1980s, as a result of the Fisherian decrease in interest rates and opportunity cost,
without a corresponding subsequent increase in inﬂation or nominal income, which
thus biases the estimated eﬀect of money growth on inﬂation. That strong increase
in money level can clearly be seen on Figure 6, around 1983. Even reverse causality
can appear in estimation results, given that this strong increase in money holdings
was preceded by high inﬂation. More generally, this issue arises whenever there is a
major inﬂation regime change.
Figure 7 displays the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) ﬁltered series of U.S. money growth,
inﬂation, and the opportunity cost of money. Money growth is adjusted by potential
output growth, which does not aﬀect ﬂuctuations but only the level and thus, given
17Note that the latest increase in MUS reﬂects a strong fall in opportunity cost, as interest rates
reached historially low levels (see Figure 3).
19the unitary income elasticity, makes it directly comparable to inﬂation. The variables
are ﬁltered to purge from short run phenomena and uncover long run comovements.
The ﬁltered opportunity cost removes short-term inﬂuences, like liquidity or business
cycle eﬀects, and picks up only inﬂation trends, as can be seen from Figure 7.
Note that the opportunity cost is computed as the diﬀerence between the 3-month
market interest rate and the weighted average of rates oﬀered on the diﬀerent deposits
included in MUS. So we would expect commercial banks to adapt deposit rates to
market rates with inﬂation regime changes and thus to obtain a stationary opportu-
nity cost without low-frequency Fisherian movements. However, in addition to the
facts that deposits rates are usually sticky18 and that some accounts are not remu-
nerated, the facts that interest payments were prohibited on checking accounts and
ceilings were imposed on rates served on savings accounts before the 1980s, and that
in addition interest rates were introduced on checking accounts in the early 1980s,
contributed to the low-frequency Fisherian opportunity cost movements. Note that
low-frequency opportunity cost movements can also come from real factors; however,
in the datasets considered in this paper, they are dominated by Fisherian movements.
We clearly see from Figure 7 that the major discrepancies between money growth
and inﬂation - notwithstanding sample extremities HP related movements - occurred
when changes in inﬂationary environments (accelerating inﬂation or disinﬂation) and
the corresponding low-frequency Fisherian movements in interest rates and opportu-
nity cost occurred, i.e. in the late 1960s (initial inﬂation increase), late 1970s (inﬂation
burst) and early 1980s (disinﬂation).
To understand how these discrepancies aﬀect econometric estimates, and how the
problem can be appropriately dealt with, note that by deﬁnition, given that money
18See e.g. Moore, Porter and Small (1990).
20growth has been adjusted for real output growth, velocity growth is the diﬀerence
between inﬂation and money growth, and the velocity level is mirrored by the op-
portunity cost level. Velocity low-frequency movements, which I call equilibrium
movements, thus occur with changes in inﬂation regimes, due to money balances
adjustment to changes in inﬂationary environments and opportunity cost, and are
associated with low-frequency discrepancies in the money growth / inﬂation relation-
ship, as these monetary movements are without consequences for future inﬂation.
Moreover, velocity growth is clearly negatively correlated with money growth, with
the negative comovements occurring when interest rates move as a result of changes
in inﬂationary environments: velocity grew strongly in the late 1960s and late 1970s,
as interest rates increased and money growth decreased, and velocity decreased in
the early 1980s, as interest rates decreased and money growth increased. In the other
periods, except at both sample extremities, velocity was stable and inﬂation was
approximately equal to money growth (adjusted by output growth).
Eﬀects on econometric estimates - These negative comovements aﬀect econometric
estimates in the following way. Let ν be equilibrium velocity growth. Then, if we
estimate equation (5) instead of equation (4), we obtain the OLS estimate in (6).
πt = β + β1µt + β2νt +  t (4)
πt = γ + γ1µt + ut (5)
γ
OLS




As it is clear from the discussion above and Figure 7, as well as from the averages
presented in the next section, money growth is negatively correlated with velocity
21growth driven by low-frequency (equilibrium) Fisherian interest rate changes. Thus,
if systematic changes in velocity are not accounted for by controlling for interest rate
equilibrium movements, regressing inﬂation on money growth leads to a coeﬃcient on
money growth below unity (and often non-signiﬁcant). This applies to cross-section as
well as time series dynamic estimations of the inﬂuence of money growth on inﬂation.
Indeed, cross-country studies of the money growth / inﬂation relationship, e.g. De
Grauwe and Polan (2001) and Gerlach (1995), have found a non-proportional link be-
tween these variables. Gerlach argues that one potential cause of non-proportionality
comes from the omitted variable reasoning discussed above. While De Grauwe and
Polan argue that this negative correlation is diﬃcult to interpret for low inﬂation
countries in the sense that this cannot reﬂect a short run liquidity eﬀect, and inter-
pret it as exogenous (technological and institutional) velocity changes unrelated to
growth rates of the money stock but to which money growth adjusts, Nelson (2003)
argues that the negative correlation due to the Fisher eﬀect, “could easily leave an
imprint on long runs of annual data”, which is conﬁrmed by Figure 7 and in the next
section.
The following analysis will show that not accounting for these low-frequency equi-
librium velocity movements indeed generally leads to a non-signiﬁcant, or at least
non-proportional inﬂuence of money growth on inﬂation or nominal income. More-
over, the extent of the bias depends on the period considered. Consider, for example,
Figure 8, which shows the low-frequency movements of euro area variables, i.e. M2
growth, inﬂation and the 10-year interest rate. Most euro area studies use a sample
beginning in the early 1980s, which is dominated by the disinﬂation period. During
that time, inﬂation decreased faster and by more than money growth did, given that
22the Fisherian decrease in interest rates made money holdings more attractive. Conse-
quently, econometric estimates can lead to an above proportional inﬂuence of money
growth on inﬂation, as is the case for example with the OLS estimates presented
below. But in general, i.e. over longer sample periods, not accounting for changes in
equilibrium velocity weakens the estimated relationship between money growth and
subsequent inﬂation, and results in a less than proportional link. When changes in
interest rates are not accounted for, a proportional link would thus only occur by
accident, due to a particular sample choice. However, as shown below, accounting
for equilibrium velocity movements leads to a clear proportional relationship between
money growth and subsequent inﬂation.
B. Accounting for equilibrium velocity movements
In order to account for equilibrium velocity movements, the opportunity cost of
money holdings is (HP) ﬁltered, and then money growth is adjusted by real potential
output growth and by the change in the ﬁltered opportunity cost. The ﬁltered oppor-
tunity cost represents equilibrium opportunity cost and thus determines equilibrium
velocity via the estimated long run money demand relationship discussed in section
I. The resulting series, e µ










where all variables are expressed in logarithm, ∆xt = xt − xt−4, mX is a monetary
aggregate, yp is real potential output, iHP is the HP ﬁltered opportunity cost of
money holdings, and εi is the absolute value of the interest rate elasticity estimated
23in section I19.T i m eu n i t sa r eq u a r t e r s .T h eu p p e r - s c r i p tX represents the diﬀerent
aggregates and countries considered, e.g. e µ
2EA represents the net growth rate of M2
(2) in the euro area (EA), and e µ
US represents net U.S. money growth.
In equation (7), money growth is corrected by real potential output growth to
account for the fact that variations in money growth and potential real output growth
oﬀset each others with respect to inﬂation developments. Note however that whether
money growth is adjusted by real potential output growth or not does not aﬀect
signiﬁcantly the quantitative results. I correct by potential instead of actual real
output as this allows me, in a ﬁrst stage, to use this measure to assess the total
eﬀe c to fm o n e yg r o w t ho ni n ﬂation rather than only the marginal eﬀect of money
given output evolution. Moreover, correcting money growth by actual output would
cause µX to increase as output decreases after a contractionary policy for example,
thus distorting the information of monetary aggregates and potentially resulting in an
estimated reverse causality between money growth and inﬂation, as inﬂation usually
responds to money with longer lags than output does.
Thus, in equation (7), money growth is adjusted by the change in equilibrium ve-
locity; e.g. if interest rates decrease as a result of disinﬂation, the third term on
the right-hand side (εi∆iHP
t ) will be negative, thus money growth will be adjusted
downwards as part of the increase in actual money balances (∆mX
t )r e ﬂects an ad-
justment of money demand to lower interest rates (Fisher eﬀect) and should thus
have no impact on future inﬂation developments.
In the empirical analysis below, I consider two additional adjusted money growth

















X is used instead of e µ
X when real or nominal output is included in the VAR. Using
e µ
X or b µ
X, i.e. accounting for equilibrium velocity movements, will lead to a signiﬁ-
cant and proportional relationship between money growth and subsequent inﬂation.
In contrast, the relationship will vanish when these equilibrium movements are not
accounted for, i.e. when µX or ∆mX are used. µX is used when output is not included
as a separate variable in the VAR, to contrast with e µ
X and show that the main source
of discrepancy comes from low-frequency interest rate movements (rather than real
potential output growth); however, results are not signiﬁcantly aﬀected if ∆mX is
used instead of µX.
C. Long run averages, low frequency and proportionality
For euro area data, Neumann (2003), for example, presents sub-periods averages of
inﬂation, money growth and real output growth, in his Table 1. A subtle feature of
those numbers is that, for every of the three sub-samples considered, money in excess
of real output growth grows faster than inﬂation, by about 1 percentage point per year
on average, although this fact is not emphasized in his paper. For example, over the
1990s (1991-2002), µ3EA averaged at 3.85 percent per year, but inﬂation averaged at
2.49 percent. However, when adjusted by changes in equilibrium velocity, i.e. using
equation (7) above, money growth is close to inﬂation, i.e. e µ
3EA averaged at 2.32
25percent per year. Not accounting for the eﬀect of disinﬂa t i o nt h u sr e s u l t e di na b o u t
1.4 percent per year of money growth that does not reﬂect on inﬂation. Similarly,
when the whole disinﬂation period (1980-2003) is considered, µ3EA averaged at 5.15
percent per year, whereas e µ
3EA and inﬂation both averaged at 4.15 percent per year.
Thus, over the 1980s and 1990s disinﬂation, money grew in excess of real output
growth by over 25 percentage points more than prices did. Estimates that do not
account for the eﬀects of changes in equilibrium velocity will thus ﬁnd a weaker link
between money and inﬂation, in the short as well as the long run.
Results are similar with U.S. data. Over the disinﬂation period (1982-1990), µUS
averaged at 6.3 percent per year, while e µ
US and inﬂa t i o na v e r a g e da t4.5 percent per
year and 4.1 percent per year, respectively. Thus, during the disinﬂation period in
the U.S., the discrepancy was about 2 percentage points per year. During the 1990s
however, when the opportunity cost of money was stationary, all measures coincide,
i.e. µUS, e µ
US as well as inﬂation all averaged at 3 percent per year.
Thus, comparing across these economies or over diﬀerent periods, there is a clear
proportional relationship between inﬂation and money growth when changes in equi-
librium velocity are accounted for, i.e. there is a one-to-one relationship between e µ
X
and inﬂation even for low inﬂation economies like the U.S. and the euro area.
The low-frequency consequences of equilibrium velocity movements can best be
seen by considering cross-spectral analysis20. Figures 9 and 10 display plots of the
gain for the cross-spectrum of U.S. money growth and inﬂation (with 90 percent
20I am thankful to Luca Benati for presenting the consequences of my analysis in the frequency-
domain when discussing my paper. Benati showed, with partial cross-spectral methods, that the
gain at frequency zero increases to .87 with euro area data and .75 with U.S. data, both not signif-
icantly diﬀerent from unity, when including the opportunity cost. Here I directly impose long run
money demand estimates when computing net money growth; not doing so can generate results with
potentially inconsistent implied money demand relationships.
26bootstrapped conﬁdence intervals), without and with equilibrium velocity adjustment,
respectively, and Figures 11 and 12 display the same information for euro area data.
The gain represents the frequency-domain equivalent of the sum of coeﬃcients on
m o n e yg r o w t hi nat i m e - d o m a i ni n ﬂation equation. We clearly see a proportional
relationship at frequency zero when equilibrium velocity is accounted for, and a below
proportionality relationship when these equilibrium movements are not taken into
account. The coherence, not displayed here, is unity at frequency zero for both U.S.
and euro area data, with and without velocity adjustment.
D. Money growth and inﬂation dynamics reconsidered
We now turn to empirical estimates of the dynamic relationship between money
growth and inﬂation. The focus here is on the usefulness of money growth in pre-
dicting future inﬂation, as developed in FK for example, i.e. we will look at whether
money growth contains information on future inﬂation or nominal income growth be-
yond what is already contained in movements of these variables. The discussion will
thus not address causality in a structural sense; for the purpose of this paper, it is
best looking at money as a “quantity-side” measure of monetary conditions induced
by monetary policy, following Nelson’s (2003) terminology.
Illustration of the bias with OLS estimates - As an illustration of the discussion in
section II.A, consider a regression of annual inﬂation, πt, on current and prior years’
net money growth for the euro area (1977-2003, time units are quarters). This yields
πt = −0.32 + 0.20 · e µ
2EA
t +0 .32 · e µ
2EA
t−4 +0 .20 · e µ
2EA
t−8 +0 .25 · e µ
2EA
t−12 +  t, (10)
(0.40) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.12)
27R2 =0 .86,w i t hac o e ﬃcients sum of 0.97 on net money growth21.T h i s e q u a t i o n
thus displays a proportional link between net money growth and inﬂation, although
it does not say anything about “causality” issues, which will be addressed below with
a VAR analysis.
However, if instead money growth is not adjusted by changes in equilibrium velocity,
we obtain the following results:
πt = −1.91 + 0.41 · µ
2EA
t +0 .51 · µ
2EA
t−4 +0 .32 · µ
2EA
t−8 +  t, (11)
(0.57) (0.12) (0.09) (0.15)
R2 =0 .79,w i t hac o e ﬃcients sum of 1.24 on money growth. A coeﬃcient higher
than unity on money growth means that, during the disinﬂation period, inﬂation
decreased by more than money growth did, if we do not account for interest rates
equilibrium movements. This is exactly what we would expect, as falling interest
rates lowered the opportunity cost of money, which induced an additional increase
in the level of money balances. Furthermore, the regression constant is negative
and signiﬁcant, further indicating a decline in inﬂation apparently independent from
money growth, which in fact represents the decrease in velocity. In general, whether
t h eb i a si sr e ﬂected in the constant, in the money growth coeﬃcients or in other
variables considered, depends on the relative variances of money growth and velocity
and on the covariance between these variables. This aﬀects dynamic relationships
between the variables considered.
The bias discussed in the previous paragraph can be called the disinﬂation bias.
21In this and the following OLS regressions, I include only annual lags signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
Newey-West standard errors in parentheses.
28However, in general, when samples include periods of accelerating inﬂation as well as
disinﬂation, empirical estimates will display a below rather than above proportional
relationship between money growth and inﬂation, due to the omitted variable bias
and the negative correlation between money growth and velocity growth discussed in
section II.A. Indeed, an OLS regression similar to equation (11) but with U.S. data,
over the 1953-2004 sample, yields a coeﬃcients sum of 0.63, i.e. well below unity.
Again, when equilibrium velocity movements are accounted for, as in equation (10),
we recover a coeﬃcients sum of 1.00,i . ew eﬁnd proportionality with U.S. data as
well.
Variance decomposition and Granger causality - Estimates from single-equation re-
gressions like equations (10) and (11) might however be biased due to reverse causality
and exogenous inﬂation persistence. The following analysis thus uses VARs, addresses
the “causality” issue, and relates the ﬁndings to previously established results, par-
ticularly to FK.
U.S. data - We ﬁrst examine the dynamic relationship between U.S. money growth
and inﬂation. Figure 13 displays the impulse-response functions (IR) of a bivariate
VAR, estimated over the whole sample (1953-2004), comprising inﬂation and net
money growth (MUSNG stands for e µ
US), and Figure 14 displays the forecast error
variance decompositions (VD), with 95-percent conﬁdence intervals22.
Impulse-response functions display a signiﬁcant inﬂuence of net money growth
“shocks” on inﬂation, and net money growth accounts for 60 percent of the inﬂation
forecast error variance after 4 years. Note that "shocks" here do not have struc-
22Time units are quarters. The lag length, according to the Akaike info criterion, is 11 quarters.
Monte Carlo conﬁdence intervals with 100 draws are displayed. The orthogonalization order is
inﬂation ﬁrst; results are not signiﬁcantly aﬀected by the ordering. Also, considering b µ
US instead of
e µ
US, i.e. not correcting money growth by potential output growth, does not aﬀect the results.
29tural interpretations. Granger-causality tests indicate both that net money growth
Granger-causes inﬂation (p-value: 0.013)a n dt h a ti n ﬂation Granger-causes net money
growth (p-value: 0.001). When sub-samples starting in the early 1970s or early 1980s
are considered, estimates are less precise, but the variance decompositions remain
similar, with net money growth signiﬁc a n t l ya c c o u n t i n gf o r5 0t o6 0p e r c e n to ft h e
inﬂation forecast error variance after 4 years, and the impulse-response functions re-
main little aﬀected. Additional comparisons of sub-periods and speciﬁcations are
presented below, in Tables 2-5.
In contrast, when equilibrium changes in velocity are not taken into account, i.e.
when not-velocity-adjusted money growth (µUS) is used instead of net money growth
(e µ
US), the estimated inﬂuence of money growth on inﬂation deteriorates dramatically.
Figures 15 and 16 present results of a bivariate VAR similar to the previous one, but
with not-velocity-adjusted money growth (MUSYG stands for µUS) instead of net
money growth. When equilibrium interest rate changes are not accounted for, the
response of inﬂation to money growth from the impulse-response function is weak
and insigniﬁcant, and the response of money growth to inﬂation is signiﬁcant. More-
over, money growth now only accounts for a non-signiﬁcant low percentage of the
inﬂation forecast error variance, compared to a signiﬁcant 60 percent when changes
in equilibrium velocity were accounted for. In this case, money growth does not
Granger-cause inﬂation (p-value: 0.135), but inﬂation Granger-causes money growth
(p-value: 0.000).
Euro area data - Equilibrium velocity movements aﬀe c te u r oa r e ad a t ai nas i m i l a r
way. Figure 17 displays the impulse-response functions of a bivariate VAR, estimated
over the 1975-2003 period, comprising inﬂation and net money growth (M2NG stands
30for e µ
2EA), and Figure 18 displays the variance decompositions, with 95% conﬁdence
intervals23.
Granger causality tests indicate that net money growth Granger-causes inﬂation
(p-value: 0.007)b u tt h a ti n ﬂation does not Granger-cause net money growth (p-value:
0.673). Inﬂation responds signiﬁcantly to a net money growth shock, but net money
growth is not signiﬁcantly aﬀected by an inﬂation shock. Net money growth also
signiﬁcantly accounts for 60 percent of the inﬂation forecast error variance, whereas
inﬂation does not signiﬁcantly account for net money growth forecast error variance.
However, when equilibrium changes in velocity are not taken into account, i.e.
when not-velocity-adjusted money growth (µ2EA) is used instead of net money growth
(e µ
2EA), the estimated inﬂuence of money growth on inﬂation deteriorates dramati-
cally. Figures 19 and 20 display the impulse responses and the variance decomposi-
tions of a bivariate VAR similar to the previous one, but with not-velocity-adjusted
money growth (M2GY stands for µ2EA)i n s t e a do fn e tm o n e yg r o w t h . G r a n g e r -
causality tests in this case indicate that net money growth only barely Granger-causes
inﬂation at the 95-percent level (p-value: 0.049), and this worsens when the disinﬂa-
tion sample (1980-2003) only is considered (p-value: 0.085). In the latter case, the
p-value of the null hypothesis that inﬂation does not Granger-cause money growth
even drops to 0.145. Moreover, the response of inﬂation to money growth from
the impulse response functions is insigniﬁcant and the response of money growth to
inﬂation becomes signiﬁcant. In addition, money growth now only accounts for a
non-signiﬁcant low percentage of the inﬂation forecast error variance, compared to 60
23Time units are quarters. The lag length, according to the Akaike info criterion, is 5 quarters.
Monte Carlo conﬁdence intervals with 100 draws are displayed. The orthogonalization order is
inﬂation ﬁrst; results are not signiﬁcantly aﬀected by the ordering. Also, considering b µ
2EA instead
of e µ
2EA, i.e. not correcting money growth by potential output growth, does not aﬀect the results.
31percent when equilibrium velocity changes were accounted for.
Robustness to speciﬁcations and samples - Tables 2-5 report variance decomposi-
tions and Granger-causality tests for diﬀerent VAR speciﬁcations, with both U.S.
and euro area (E.A.) data, and for the U.S. sub-sample starting in the early 1970s
to relate the ﬁndings to FK’s results. Tables 2-3 present results when equilibrium
velocity movements are accounted for, and tables 4-5 present results when these equi-
librium adjustments are omitted. The left column displays the variables included in
the VAR and the orthogonalization order, the second and third columns include U.S.
data results with full sample and the sub-period starting in 1970 to relate to FK,
respectively, and the last column displays results for the euro area sample. The ﬁrst
VAR considered includes inﬂation and money growth, the second speciﬁcation in-
cludes nominal income growth (∆yn) and money growth, and the third VAR includes
real output growth, inﬂation and money growth. Money growth is not adjusted by
potential output in the second and third speciﬁcations, as output is included as a
separate variable.
Tables 2 and 4 report inﬂation (ﬁrst and third lines) or nominal income growth
(second line) forecast error variance, at a 5-year horizon, due to a money growth shock,
with 95-percent conﬁdence intervals24. Tables 3 and 5 display Granger-causality tests.
The ﬁrst two lines report p-values of the null hypothesis that money growth does not
Granger-cause inﬂation. The values a/b/c in the third line are p-values of the null
hypothesis that money growth does not Granger-cause inﬂation (a), money growth
does not Granger-cause real output growth (b), and real output growth does not
Granger-cause inﬂation (c), respectively.
From Table 2, we see that, when equilibrium velocity adjustments are accounted
24Monte Carlo simulations with 100 draws.
32for, money growth “shocks” signiﬁcantly account for 40 to 60 percent of the inﬂation or
nominal income growth forecast error variance, for all speciﬁcations/samples/economies
considered. However, from Table 4, when equilibrium velocity adjustments are not
accounted for, those shares drop to only about 20 percent and are non-signiﬁcant.
Regarding Granger causality, in Table 3, two-variable VARs (ﬁrst two rows) usually
indicate that money growth causes inﬂation and nominal income at the 95-percent
signiﬁcance level when velocity adjustments are accounted for, except in two cases
where p-values are 0.06 and 0.10. However, when velocity adjustments are omitted, in
Table 5, p-values substantially increase in all cases, and money growth does not cause
inﬂation anymore. In the three-variable systems (last row), money growth Granger-
causes inﬂation in the euro area when equilibrium adjustments are accounted for, but
this is not the case anymore without adjustment. In the U.S. case, when equilibrium
velocity adjustments are accounted for, money growth causes inﬂation via its inﬂuence
on real output growth, whereas that channel disappears when equilibrium velocity
adjustments are not accounted for. Note also that if we use the same samples and
speciﬁcations as FK, i.e. the 1970:3-1990:4 sample and four lags, but if we account for
equilibrium velocity movements, we ﬁnd that money growth Granger-causes nominal
income growth in the two-variable VAR (p-value: 0.046) and that money growth
Granger-causes inﬂation in the three-variable VAR (p-value: 0.00); FK, in contrast,
found that M1 and M2 growth Granger-cause nominal income growth only at the
P ≤ 0.1 level, and that none of the monetary aggregates considered Granger-cause
inﬂation, even at the P ≤ 0.1 level. Note that Batini and Nelson (2001), who looked
at the correlation of inﬂation with money growth in diﬀerent sub-samples, already
pointed out the constant steady-state velocity growth assumption as a weakness of
33FK’s analysis.
Another interesting result is that when interest rates or interest rate spreads (be-
tween interest rates and their equilibria) are included in VARs as well, results are
not signiﬁcantly aﬀected, i.e. money growth adjusted by equilibrium velocity signiﬁ-
cantly accounts for a large share of inﬂation forecast error variance, and interest rates
account for a small and non-signiﬁcant share of that variance.
Summarizing the results of this section, variance decompositions and Granger-
causality tests indicate a strong relationship between money growth and subsequent
movements in inﬂation and nominal income, when equilibrium velocity movements
are accounted for, but the relationship disappears if equilibrium velocity movements
are not accounted for. This holds for both U.S. and euro area data, for diﬀerent spec-
iﬁc a t i o n sa n dv a r i a b l e so r d e r i n g ,a n dd i ﬀerent sub-periods. Results can diﬀer slightly
across samples or speciﬁcations, but the general result that not accounting for equi-
librium movements in equilibrium velocity dramatically deteriorates the relationship
between money growth and subsequent inﬂation is very robust.
E. Relating the analysis to other studies
The ﬁndings of this paper have already been compared above with previous litera-
ture results, particularly with FK’s results, which are often cited as evidence against
the usefulness of monetary aggregates for monetary policy, and which marked the
“near-end” of research interest on this topic in the U.S. I contrast here my analysis to
a few other recent papers, mostly using euro area data and supportive of monetary
aggregates, by presenting the way equilibrium velocity is implicitly treated in those
studies.
34Several papers, e.g. Neumann (2003), Neumann and Greiber (2004) and Gerlach
(2003, 2004), have been looking for a separate low-frequency channel for money in the
transmission mechanism, and report a prominent role for monetary aggregates. How-
ever, they do not account for interest rates equilibrium ﬂuctuations; in these studies,
measures of core money growth (i.e. money growth adjusted by real output growth, µ
in my notation, but adjusted by actual instead of potential output, with the potential
reverse causality eﬀects discussed in section II.B) are thus higher than inﬂation on
average and over most of the 1980s and 1990s sample period. This latter fact does
not appear explicitly in their analysis for diﬀerent reasons. Neumann explicitly disre-
gards the early 1980s period, when the main disinﬂation occurred, in its estimation.
Neumann and Greiber estimate income elasticity to be 1.5.A sd i s c u s s e di ns e c t i o n
I.B, this estimate (or in general an estimate biased upwards) can turn out of a model
of the 1980s and 1990s or where the opportunity cost is modeled as the long/short
interest rate spread. Such an income elasticity compensates for the fact that inﬂation
decreased by more than money growth did over the 1980s and 1990s, but only on
average, i.e. output ﬂuctuations do not necessarily always compensate for money re-
sponses to opportunity cost changes, and this model speciﬁcation would probably not
ﬁt the data if the sample were extended to include the pre-1980s period. Gerlach, in
his graphical analysis, normalizes the data, which removes the relatively higher aver-
age growth rate of money but aﬀects the money/inﬂation relationship if velocity does
not follow a deterministic time trend. Velocity is assumed to follow a deterministic
time trend in his econometric analysis as well, which, even if it were the case, aﬀects
the estimated coeﬃcients depending on how money growth ﬂuctuates and comoves
with equilibrium velocity. This fact is recognized by Gerlach (2003), who argues that
35there should be no presumption of proportionality between core money growth and
inﬂation, from the standard omitted variables reasoning discussed in section II.A.
Using the same approach, but with frequency-domain analysis, Assenmacher-Wesche
and Gerlach (2005) demean the data, and Bruggeman et al. (2005) consider a sample
starting only in the late 1980s, where inﬂation could be considered as stationary.
Orphanides and Porter (2001) look at the overall eﬀect of money on inﬂa t i o ni na
P-star model. They account for a long run trend in U.S. M2 velocity from the 1960s
till the early 1990s and then adjust that equilibrium velocity upwards to account for
the M2 instability discussed in section I.A, but do not adjust for equilibrium velocity
movements associated with diﬀerent inﬂation regimes.
Other studies have looked at the marginal eﬀect of money growth on inﬂation in
cointegrating frameworks. For example, Carlson, Hoﬀman, Keen and Rasche (2000)
ﬁnd that money demand short-term deviations (cointegrating errors) have marginal
predictive power for short-term nominal GDP ﬂuctuations; there, velocity is deﬁned
by the cointegrating relationship, and the explanatory power of deviations from ve-
locity evaluated at the current values of the variable considered is assessed. Kugler
and Kaufmann (2005) present a cointegrating relationship between money growth
and inﬂation. They have diﬀerent orders of integration for money and prices (I(2))
than for interest rates (I(1)), thus their estimated long run relationship is not aﬀected
by interest rate changes. They however allow for a trend in real money balances, and
ﬁnd evidence for a second regime when inﬂation and interest rates were increasing
in the late 1970s / early 1980s, with decreasing rates in real money growth. The
second regime thus corresponds to the period when velocity growth was positive and
increasing, before becoming negative and relatively stationary since the mid-1980s.
36As argued in section II.A., in general, not accounting for changes in equilibrium
velocity and interest rates when assessing the inﬂuence of money growth on inﬂation
results in biased coeﬃcients on money growth and on the other variables considered.
Moreover, results are dependent of the sample considered: as explained above, the bias
in accelerating inﬂation or disinﬂation samples are diﬀerent than periods including
both episodes, as the underlying trend and ﬂuctuations in velocity growth diﬀer.
III. Conclusion
Less attention has been paid to monetary aggregates in the past 20 years, as many
diﬀerent money demand speciﬁcations or instability results have emerged from econo-
metric studies, and the reported estimated inﬂuence of money growth on inﬂation
has usually been non-signiﬁcant, or at least non-proportional, in time series as well
as cross-country studies.
This paper has on the contrary found a signiﬁcant and proportional relationship
between money growth and subsequent inﬂation, when equilibrium changes in veloc-
ity are accounted for. I have shown that not accounting for interest rates equilibrium
movements biases the estimated inﬂuence of money growth and other variables on
inﬂation, and in particular weakens the estimated inﬂuence of money growth on in-
ﬂation. Furthermore, I have suggested reasons why diﬀerent money demand relation-
ships have coexisted in the literature, particularly with respect to aggregate income
elasticity, which turns out to be unity when the Baumol-Tobin transaction concept is
considered.
The current low inﬂation rates in industrialized countries can thus be explained by
much lower money growth rates nowadays - and immediately preceding the current
37low inﬂation period - than in the 1970s and 1980s. Relative price shocks like e.g.
an increase in international competition, a commonly used argument to explain the
current low inﬂation environment, or an oil price shock, cannot aﬀect growth rates
of the general price level without a corresponding change in monetary conditions
induced by central banks.
While money demand relationships have been remarkably stable in the past 30
y e a r s ,t h ed r a m a t i ci n c r e a s ei nﬁnancial market participation in the U.S. during the
1970s, as documented in Reynard (2004), caused a decline in aggregate money hold-
ings and biased aggregate money demand relationships. Similarly, but in the opposite
direction, very low interest rates can generate nonlinearity due to changes in ﬁnancial
market participation, which would induce relatively high growth rates in monetary
aggregates not followed by high inﬂation. Part of the recent relatively high growth
rates in monetary aggregates, particularly i nt h ee u r oa r e a ,a r el i k e l yt ob er e l a t e dt o
that phenomenon. Those facts act as warning signals when interpreting short-term
monetary aggregates growth rate ﬂuctuations and call for more research on those
nonlinearity issues.
The eﬀects of this paper analysis on various results presented in the literature
regarding the inﬂuence of monetary aggregates and other variables on inﬂation and
output growth, using cross-country or time series models, are left for future work.
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431949-1969 1977-2003
Interest Rate Elasticity -0.065 -0.128
(0.031) (0.021)
Income Elasticity 1.001 1.039
(0.074) (0.063)
DOLS standard errors in parenthesis.
Table 1. MUS Money Demand Estimates
44U.S. (1953-2004) U.S. (1970-2004) E.A. (1975-2003)
π,e µ 60 ± 33 61 ± 38 53 ± 39
∆yn,b µ 40 ± 26 36 ± 26 40 ± 27
∆y,π,b µ 60 ± 32 51 ± 35 43 ± 34
5-year horizon forecast error variance (in percent) of inﬂation (1st & 3rd row)
and nominal income (2nd row) to a money growth shock.
Ranges indicated represent 95-percent conﬁdence intervals.
U.S. lag # (AIK): 11, 10, 10, respectively. E.A. lag # (AIK): 5, 5, 5, respectively.
Table 2. Variance Decomposition - Equilibrium-Velocity Adjusted
U.S. (1953-2004) U.S. (1970-2004) E.A. (1975-2003)
π,e µ 0.01 0.10 0.00
∆yn,b µ 0.01 0.01 0.06
∆y,π,b µ 0.07/0.02/0.01 0.06/0.049/0.00 0.03/0.33/0.37
P-values of Granger-causality tests. Rows 1-2 report p-values of the null hyp.
that money growth does not Granger-cause inﬂation. In row 3, a/b/c are p-values
of the null hyp. that money growth does not Granger-cause inﬂation (a), money
growth does not Granger-cause real output growth (b), and real output growth
does not Granger-cause inﬂation (c), respectively. Lags as in Table 2.
Table 3. Granger Causality - Equilibrium-Velocity Adjusted
U.S. (1953-2004) U.S. (1970-2004) E.A. (1975-2003)
π,µ 21 ± 27 17 ± 30 19 ± 36
∆yn,∆m 20 ± 22 18 ± 22 28 ± 32
∆y,π,∆m 22 ± 26 15 ± 27 22 ± 29
See notes in Table 2.
U.S. lag # (AIK): 11, 10, 11, respectively. E.A. lag # (AIK): 5, 9, 5, respectively.
Table 4. Variance Decomposition - Not Velocity-Adjusted
U.S. (1953-2004) U.S. (1970-2004) E.A. (1975-2003)
π,µ 0.14 0.37 0.05
∆yn,∆m 0.12 0.07 0.24
∆y,π,∆m 0.24/0.43/0.01 0.16/0.35/0.00 0.12/0.26/0.22
See notes in Table 3. Lags as in Table 4.
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Fig. 20. VD of not-velocity-adjusted money growth and inﬂation - E.A. (1975-2003)
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